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DANGERS

WHICH

THREATEN EUROPE.

PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE WANT OF SUCCESS

IN THE

LATE CAMPAIGN:

The ERRORS to be shunned, and the MEANS to
be taken to render the present Decisive in
favor of the Real Friends of
ORDER and PEACE.

Translated from the FRENCH of M. MALLET DU PAN.

L O N D O N :

Printed for T. BOOSEY, No 4, OLD BROAD STREET,
and R. CHEESWRIGHT, No 39, KING STREET,
CHEAPSIDE.

DANGERS

THE BRITISH MUSEUM



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AND THE
MUSEUM OF
NATURAL HISTORY

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LONDON
Printed by ROBERT N. & CO. Broad Street,
and R. N. & CO. 100, King Street,
CITY OF LONDON.

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PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE WANT OF
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FAULTS TO BE SHUNNED, AND MEANS
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ALL Europe is involved in cir-
cumstances hitherto without pre-
cedent. It has to combat enemies
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really formidable by their number, their courage, and resources of all kinds; but still more dangerous by their horrid and dark conspiracies; by their criminal indifference about the means of obtaining success; by their principles of anarchy and disorganization, so well contrived to delude the multitude; by the correspondence they have contrived to keep up in all countries, in all classes, even with some ministers! . . . Respect arrests my pen, and prevents my pointing out, to the astonishment of future ages, characters still more conspicuous.

It is a *war of extermination*, as the regicides themselves have, with great reason, named it. The monster of anarchy must perish, or Europe must expect to see the downfall of every throne, the dissolution of all the bands of subordination and society, the abolition and contempt of all religion, the subversion of all principle, the violent attack of all property, and the massacre of
half

half its population!! Such is the only regeneration that one ought and that one can reasonably look for, on the part of those parricides, that have imbrued their hands in the blood of the most just of kings, and from the union of the deepest depravity the world has witnessed: for, since crime has prevailed in France, from the time that the grand machine, shaken to its foundations, has menaced all with speedy destruction, we have seen the very scum and outcasts of society, collected from all parts, around this centre of corruption; as hungry hyenas, attracted by the exhalations of dead bodies, unite to share the horrid repast.

The present has no resemblance to ordinary wars, in themselves sufficiently disgusting, but, at least, subject to some laws which diminish their horror, interrupted by some suspensions which give a respite to humanity, and followed by a peace which gives a hope of repairing the wreck. Here

there is no quarter, no remission: it is an animal of devastation, which has already desolated the country which gave it birth, and against which the neighbouring countries have been forced to take arms, as a means of avoiding the same fate. It is social order struggling with barbarism; it is, in some sort, nature combining her efforts to avoid a return to a state of ruin and chaos. Who could believe that Europe would look on and behold a torrent forming and swelling, of which the origin and progress so clearly announced its ravages, without seeing that it threatened its safety, or at least without opposing some obstacle to it? If those, who directed its course, had not been restrained at the outset by the fears and considerations which they afterwards so well surmounted; if they had displayed, at the epoch of the first attacks of *Mons* and *Tournay*, that concert of measures and that boldness in the execution of them, which at present make the safety of mankind a problem; the evils I

now

now announce, only with a view of effectually avoiding them, would have overwhelmed the surface of Europe; the earth itself would have been a vast field of blood and carnage: and this is not an idle speculation, a chimerical fear. They had the power: and, before a sufficient force could have been collected to stop them, one half of Germany and all Holland would have fallen. They would have accumulated immense treasures; every where they would have sacrificed loyal subjects; have armed their numerous partisans; and that mass of weak people, who are governed by circumstances alone, the one and the other having rendered themselves so criminal towards all legitimate authority, would soon have shewn an equal energy in its destruction, even to the ultimate traces; the train of combustible matter spread itself on all hands; and, in this first moment of irresolution, of terror, of dismay, and of stupor, the conflagration would have been general.

Divine Providence has decreed otherwise; for, in vain should we search elsewhere for the causes and events which have so strangely confounded all human prudence and calculation. Let not those, whom experience cannot form, and whom adversity cannot teach, no longer allege these empty sounds of *the incorruptible fidelity of troops, of the natural goodness of the people, of attachment to sovereigns, &c.* . . . successful villany always finds followers and profelytes. Before that fatal period, did there exist troops more faithful, and with whom the principles of honour operated more powerfully? yet these have ranged themselves, almost without effort, under the standard of revolt. Was there a people more gentle, more feeling, more hospitable, who possessed in a greater degree all the social virtues? yet, behold at present a nation of cannibals, of *anthropophagi*, thirsting for blood, and the floods which they incessantly spill seem to have no other

other effect but to irritate their devouring appetite. In short, have the annals of history preserved in remembrance a nation more distinguished for an almost idolatrous veneration for their kings, and who have given more striking and multiplied proofs of it? yet the most just of sovereigns, the best and most loyal of men, he who united the piety of St. Louis to the paternal tenderness of Henry the IVth, in a word, the good Louis the XVIth, has perished on a scaffold. His last words to his people are words of benediction and of love; and, at the instant that the fatal axe terminates the course of so good a life, the air is rent with cries of joy; all France is in arms to support his executioners; they return to the place to celebrate the anniversary of the murder of their august victim, and the memory of this execrable affassination has been celebrated throughout the kingdom by rejoicings and patriotic hymns.

So many and so terrible examples, however, seem to have produced but transient impressions even on thrones. It may be said the spirit of blindness has lulled the victims into security, at the very moment that the dæmon of madness excites their executioners ; at the same instant a supernatural and irresistible force seems to have armed the one with the sword, and to have drawn on the other, with hasty strides, to inevitable destruction. You talk of treaties, of a perfect neutrality as if solid treaties could exist with the tiger as if it were sufficient not to have provoked him, to be safe from his fury ; you place your security in the remoteness of your situation as though a long time were required for the thunder to extend its ravages to a distance ; as if those who form an electric chain did not experience, almost at the same instant, the same shock. It looks like playing with a revolution which threatens to overturn every thing.

thing, to swallow up every thing, which makes no secret of its views, and which every day acquires new means to realize them. Your views are sordid; you form the narrow and selfish calculations of egotists, at the time that the devouring flames surround all parts of the social edifice, whilst the concurrence of all is necessary to form a barrier to their threatening progress: when it is so much your interest to be just at home and terrible abroad, you employ but half-means against the common enemy, and keep the rest of your power to create new ones.

In so strange a state of things it may be permitted, it is the duty of every friend to order to make his voice heard; when a violent conflagration appears, every one has a right to interfere to stop its ravages: let us profit of the moment ere it is yet too late. Let us not conceal then the force of the regicides; a great part of our misfortunes proceeds from our having
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been ignorant of or from our despising them: let us reserve all our contempt for their principles. I begin from a base the most simple and the most incontestible: a vast kingdom on which nature seemed to have heaped all her favours; bordered by strong places, where art seemed to have exhausted herself; a population immense, and naturally warlike, whose destructive activity will always form a balance against most of the advantages of the enemy; distinguished from other nations by an impetuosity commonly irresistible; arsenals numerous and well furnished, with means of industry and prosperity above calculation, and which, for the most part, set them always rapidly to repair their losses; a corps of engineers well instructed, artillery the most considerable, and without question the best, in Europe. . . . Such is the faithful picture of the powers of France in its ordinary circumstances.

Let

Let us add now, to so many advantages united, those which evidently arise from its state of actual crisis. The annihilation of commerce and of navigation, of all the arts of luxury, of a heap of professions and trades, has, of course, irritated all those that derived their subsistence from these sources. In the first moments of disorganization and tyranny, foreign powers might reckon on the greatest number of this discontented mass; but afterwards, terrified by examples of rigour, convinced of the danger and the inutility of their efforts, led astray by all kinds of illusion, and pressed by actual want, they put themselves into the pay of their executioners; they are rendered the very instruments of their vengeance; almost the whole of them have joined those legions that have been kept in pay at *Paris* and in the provinces, to keep alive terror and violence in every shape, or the hordes on the frontiers, not unlike those of the *ancient Normans*, who marched
with

with desolation in their train, seeking a distant death, because their own country forbade them the means of subsistence. *They* then only followed the imperious call of hunger; but, soon uniting with every thing the most depraved, they themselves became the models of corruption, and thenceforward a return to a peaceable and laborious mode of life was no longer possible; for, it may be remarked, that the discipline of camps and armies, however strict it may be, whatever activity it may require, forms only men useless or dangerous to society afterwards. It is thus that, by little and little, idleness and hunger have over-run France with criminals, that this vast kingdom is transformed into a camp bristling with bayonets, that the founderies of arms have acquired an extraordinary activity, that innumerable armies are distributed on the frontiers, and that new ones spring up, as it were, by enchantment, wherever an unforeseen accident has required their presence. We have had
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but too many proofs of the truth of this in the different epochs of the war in *la Vendée*, at *Lyons*, *Marseilles*, *Bordeaux*, *Toulon*, &c.

This nursery of men, of which a new generation, bred up in the midst of alarms, is produced daily to repair their former losses, exists only by war, profiting even by defeat, which is sure to be attributed to the treachery of their generals, to which suggestion they fall the certain sacrifice. Encouraged by successes, more or less brilliant against all their enemies, excited by the ardour of pillage, and by the most insidious and most atrocious suggestions, intoxicated by a species of fanaticism, which inspires with all its madness nations the most calm, which produces numberless traits of heroism amongst people the least warlike, led on by chiefs whose only alternative is the scaffold or success, and who can only obtain this success by the total overthrow

throw of empires ; too deeply criminal, too entirely abandoned to licentiousness and debauchery, not to dread the return of order ; always fed with the seductive hope that they will shortly repose in peace and opulence on the spoils of their victims : all concur in shewing that the revolted people of France will not cease to unite to the ardent bravery of the ancient Gauls a ferocity hitherto unknown, and that tremendous constancy which appears so utterly inconsistent with their thoughtless and sprightly character.

Shall we, in 1794, be deluded by that herd of idle and ignorant politicians who are perpetually crying out, as in the first six months of the revolution, that nothing violent can be durable, and therefore that those extraordinary efforts of France predict a speedy termination ? It is too apparent, that this general maxim can have no application in the present circumstances. Can we flatter ourselves that the effects
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will cease, when the causes acquire every day new energy? Does fire, that emblem of activity, cease to burn when supplied incessantly with fresh fuel? Does not *Vesuvius*, who eighteen hundred years ago overwhelmed with *lava* the cities of *Herculaneum* and *Pompeia*, exercise every day new ravages? How then can it be expected, that this destructive activity, which is the very essence of the present crisis, and which every thing concurs to keep up, should allow a speedy termination to your disasters? Doubtless it is a state of ardent fever which will be followed by extreme debility, but upon what grounds can you calculate the duration of the paroxysm? Doubtless the monstrous edifice of the French revolution will end in ruin, because it is built on a moving sand, and because all its parts want relation and connection; but, perhaps, a great part of the present generation will moulder away, and a general mourning cover the face of Europe, before the period of its termination arrives,

pointed

pointed out, as it has been, with such a ridiculous prophetic assurance.

Let us proceed to the state of their finances, that powerful resort of governments, which at all times decides the victory; and let us no longer be the dupes of illusion, if we find them with resources capable of sustaining indefinitely this colossus of power.

Those who are at the head of the government in France have possessed themselves of two-thirds of the territory of that kingdom, and of a mass of effects of a value incalculable, by the union of the domains of the crown with the property of the clergy and nobility. For a long time past they have swelled daily this torrent of depredation, by the spoils of the numerous victims they have sacrificed; and, if they still proceed with the same fury in the war which they have declared against all the rich, they will shortly find themselves

selves in possession of the whole property of the kingdom. All France will become the portion of successful villany; in such hands will be united all wealth and all the means of subsistence.

An enormous mass of assignats, to the emission of which no bounds are set, and which fear forces into circulation without complaint and without difficulty through the whole extent of the kingdom, serves for the payment of all articles in the interior; in a word, the pay of the troops, their subsistence, their equipment, their marches, &c. in short, all that exhaust the resources of foreign powers, cost the Convention nothing, since they have converted their paper-mills into treasuries. To such a degree have they subjugated France, that they dare attempt any thing without hesitation or fear. It is by these means that they expend at present, in six weeks, more than under the old government, which they so decry, was expended in

a whole year, even at periods of the greatest extravagance. Yet, notwithstanding this monstrous devastation, it were in vain to expect their means to be exhausted, for this can only arise from a disproportion of the efforts to the resources, and here resources spring up as it were by magic in proportion to their wants.

Such enormous expences, without doubt, have their bounds; but do all the sovereigns of Europe together possess as much as the Convention have found means to supply themselves with, by the spoils of the churches, the treasures of the crown, and the specie found among that multitude of persons, whose wealth alone has occasioned their arrest or massacre as suspected persons; by the pillage of the opulent cities of *Lyons* and *Marseilles*, and the seizure of all the gold and silver wherever it was to be found. It is by means of this treasure, scattered with profusion, that they keep in pay emissaries in all countries, that they

they receive from neutral powers, and even from their enemies, grain and other objects of consumption that cannot be dispensed with; for I am far from being of opinion with those who think that the most part of those cargoes, which continually arrive in the ports of France, are so many gratuitous succours sent them by their worthy brethren, the foreign patriots. I am sufficiently acquainted with this class of men to know, that interest is the first of their passions, even before that of doing mischief: the French have nothing to hope for from them but sanguinary wishes and underhand manœuvres, and to expect the commission of the greatest crimes if they ever attain the power of glutting their vengeance with impunity. How grievous it is to be daily more convinced, that, to the most part of mankind, nothing is wanting to make them atrocious but being left to their own natural perversity! . . . But let us resume the enumeration of the

resources of the present government of France.

Are the armies in want of any thing? Are any of their supplies retarded? These objects are put in *requisition* through the whole country; instantly every one hastens to strip himself; the thinking and wise man, on that score more exposed to their malevolence, distinguishes himself by the extent of his *patriotic* gifts, as they are called, too happy in saving his head by such a sacrifice. This is not only the case with respect to things the most trifling, as the procurement of lint and old linen for the wounded, it is extended universally to all objects without exception; nothing more is wanting to procure men and horses for the transmission of their dispatches to the provinces and the armies; the signature of the first villain that the Convention has invested with its full powers effects, as by a magic charm, in two days, what would
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take up sovereigns as many months, and at an enormous expence.

We might adduce numerous other circumstances, which all concur in proving to demonstration that the French possess a multiplicity of advantages against their enemies, essentially depending on the dreadful crisis with which they are agitated; for, what sovereign is there, be he as despotic as he may, who could dare to do once what the pretended regenerators of France have been incessantly doing for four years past? A light impost, loudly called for by circumstances for the security of persons and property, is the object of a thousand complaints and objections, whilst in France they dispose arbitrarily of every thing, and the least murmur on the part of the plundered is the signal of his execution.

It would be easy to shew the vast importance of another circumstance, which nothing can counter-balance. The regicides

fight on their own soil, surrounded by fortresses which facilitate their attacks, ensure their retreat, and afford to their armies an opportunity of reposing themselves; they have a certainty of being able easily to repair their losses. The allies, on the contrary, are in an enemy's country, surrounded by spies; their territories, exposed on all sides, have no other security but the places they can render themselves masters of; their losses can only be repaired after a long delay, and then with extraordinary difficulty and expence; in short, they should have a continuation of brilliant and uninterrupted success, to enable them to accomplish their views; for, if it should happen that victory should entirely range herself, for a single day, on the side of such frantic rage, sustained by a great superiority of number, all would be lost past redemption.

What conclusion should be drawn from such sad and incontrovertible truths? The reverse

reverse of that which the ill-designing that surround you advise; because it is, in general, sound policy to pursue a line of conduct opposite to that of your enemy. They desire a peace, that is impossible: prosecute a vigorous war, for one cannot treat but with a generous enemy. What would be thought of those peaceable navigators, who, after abundance of provocation, of outrages, and menaces, should resolve to unite their force against a pirate, from whom they could only expect slavery or death, if soon after they were observed to devote themselves as victims, and endeavour to treat with this plunderer because they met with more resistance than they expected? and that, without dreaming that their want of success is attributable to the want of union and harmony in their efforts, at the moment when a little constancy and the combination of all their forces would have rid the seas of this destructive scourge, and have

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been for ever the pledge of their security.

Let us suppose a vessel containing a great number of passengers of different descriptions, of various countries; national prejudices, difference of language, every thing concurs to render them absolutely strangers to each other, perhaps even enemies. A leak in the ship is discovered, and, for some time, no one is alarmed at its progress: at length they begin to see their danger, and a part of them set themselves diligently to work, whilst the others, as a cloak for their want of inclination, urge, as a pretext, either their weakness or their own personal security in the midst of the general alarm. At length, the danger becomes imminent, the moment of illusion is past, the image of death is present to the view of all: in an instant all their differences are forgot, they all understand each other, every one furnishes his aid to the same object, their approach

approach to the shore gives them new ardour, and the vessel is quickly safely in port. . . . The application is not equivocal, the veil is thin enough, but there is one, be it never so transparent, and henceforth the naked truth should appear. Europe is this vessel threatened with speedy destruction ; this long and fatal indifference all the powers have long had to reproach themselves with, and even at present, whilst some exhaust themselves in efforts for the safety of all, the general voice points out others that refuse their assistance to second them ; . . . perhaps that underhandedly oppose them. God forbid that the parallel should stop here ; may the urgency of the danger open their eyes at length, before it is too late. I have no doubt of the success of their united efforts ; Paris is the object to which they must aim, but let them never forget that the campaign of 1794 will irrevocably decide their destiny.

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It is without doubt this union, this harmony, which we should most ardently wish ; but, if ever we have the happiness to see the concurrence of all hearts, of all efforts, towards this one end, it will be still essentially necessary to profit of the salutary lessons of experience, and to employ a new system of tactics against an enemy that has overturned every thing. It is too evident, that there is ground for more than one reproach in the employment of the forces during the campaign of 1793. I endeavour to forget that which preceded it ; I respect the impenetrable veil which covers those operations, and I turn away my eyes from the unheard-of calamities which were the consequence, that I may repose with pleasure on this period so honourable to the Austrian arms.

Breda was taken : the important place of *Maëstricht*, bombarded with vigour, was menaced with speedy destruction : Holland
was

was on the point of being invaded, and to have ensured the triumph of crime: a species of miracle was necessary to quiet the storm. The prince of *Cobourg*, although in expectation of considerable reinforcements, in spite of the rigours of the season and the great inferiority of his forces, did not hesitate to make the attempt: there was not a moment to be lost. Success, such as the annals of history afford no example of, crowned this heroic resolution: on all sides, the regicides, panic-struck, were dispersed, cut in pieces, abandoning their magazines and artillery, flying in disorder before a small army, and in the same country where the junction of all their forces could only advance step by step against a body of fifteen thousand men harassed with fatigue. They seemed to rally at *Nerwinde*, at the call of the intrepid *Dumourier*, only to give additional lustre to the triumph of the conquerors. Numbers, impetuosity, the rage of despair, all gave way to the intrepidity of
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the brave Austrians and the expertness of their generals. Fame has never published exploits so rapid or so brilliant; every day, every hour, was the signal of fresh success; one can compare this triumphant march to nothing but the irritated waves of the ocean, overwhelming every thing in their way, and scattering on the shore, at a distance, all the impurities that fully its bosom.

Of what happy success did not these first events seem the fortunate presages? The disgrace of *Dumourier*, that man less dangerous by his extraordinary talents than by his profound wickedness, took place almost at the same moment. The bold stroke of authority, which he struck against *Beurnonville* and the four deputies that came to announce to him the supreme orders of the conventional band, his great influence over the troops, whom he had almost persuaded to march towards Paris, all seemed to announce, that the last hour of wickedness

ness was at hand. A heap of puerile inconsistencies, which can scarce be accounted for by the rage of revenge or the madness of pride, gave occasion to the entire miscarriage of the vast plan, which, in a single day, would have broken the sceptre of the Convention ; at least, the result would have been a total disorganization, and a consternation from which the greatest advantages might be expected. Enlightened and impartial observers saw with painful astonishment the inaction of the allies, while *Dampierre* collected the scattered remains of his army, and soon put himself in a condition to attack his conquerors.

Full of respect for the intentions and the talents of the generous Austrians, I conclude that powerful reasons determined their conduct ; I imagine that they wished to wait for reinforcements of men and artillery to be able afterwards to strike a decisive blow ; but, in fighting against the French, could that supply of forces balance

lance the advantage of profiting of the general terror which the name of the Austrians had inspired? Afterwards, all their attempts were victorious, but never did they dream of drawing any advantage from such success; every vigorous blow that was struck has been the signal of long inaction, which has destroyed all the fruits of it. The French, struck with terror, have always had leisure to recover themselves, although it is this salutary terror which should not have ceased for an instant to be the *order of the day*, to use the expression which those butchers apply to their victims; it is this which brought about and has supported the revolution, and if it does not powerfully concur in destroying this monstrous fabric, there is too much reason to fear that the efforts of the allied powers will but aggravate in vain the evils of humanity.

The effect of this error was evident, when, after the famous siege of *Valenciennes*, so
long

long deferred, so inactive for some time, and followed, like the rest of the operations, with a fatal inaction, they presented themselves before the camp of *César*. With what pleasure we return to this brilliant æra, when nothing could reanimate the conventional army, neither this position, which nature seems to have rendered impregnable, nor those immense labours, where art seems really to have exhausted her resources, nor the numerous artillery with which the redoubts were furnished. Terror preceded the arms of the allies, hitherto constantly victorious; their intrepidity, directed by a wise system of tactics, had, as yet, met with no obstacles. The same sentiment pervaded all the regicides. To try a fresh battle was, in the eyes of all, to expose themselves to fresh defeat, and they were seen to abandon without striking a blow, at the meer approach of the enemy, this same camp, which twenty thousand hands had put into a situation to resist every attack;

tack; which they represented not long before to the Convention as the bulwark of France, and which was generally considered as the greatest obstacle to the arrival at *Paris*. What a precious moment for striking some decisive blows, either by pursuing to the utmost the fugitive army, or by pressing the reduction of the places where this unexpected retreat had scattered terror, and who found themselves left to their own defence! What more favourable augur could there be for the rest of the campaign! Major *d'Aspre* is ordered to summon *Cambray*: from all parts he hears that the inhabitants wish to surrender; that they had scarcely any garrison, and that its resistance would be soon overcome, as they would not expose themselves to the fate of *Valenciennes*; that the place was entirely unprovided with the means of defence, and that scarcely any cannon defended the ramparts, &c. &c.

Nevertheless, the governor made the usual reply in those cases; unless where his intentions

intentions were before known : he protested he would defend himself to the last extremity. A few red-hot bullets and a couple of hundred of shells sent amongst them would have easily subdued those pretended projects of resistance, and have ensured the possession of that important place. At present, it would be necessary to waste much precious time under its walls, an immense quantity of ammunition, to have three parallels, sacrifice a great number of men in the trenches, have a numerous army to cover the siege, and to gain signal victories, merely to be able to carry on the operations. It is especially in war, that opportunity lost is seldom or never retrieved.

The refusal of the governor, without having regard to the circumstances of the place and of the conventional army, was the signal of a retrograde march. It was then that that fatality, which seems to preside over the destiny of France and to draw it

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rapidly

rapidly to destruction, gave occasion to the resolution of dividing the forces of the allies for the purpose of undertaking the sieges of *Dunkirk* and *Quesnoy*. From this period may be dated all their failures.

The Duke of York took the rout of *Dunkirk*, at the head of an army of forty thousand men. The celerity of his march ; his arrival under the walls of this city without heavy artillery, long before the time agreed upon with Admiral Macbride, who ought to have pressed on the siege on the side of the sea ; the heroic but inconsiderate intrepidity with which they pursued the enemy even to the glacis of the place ; the flight of the Irish general, who commanded the town, into England ; . . . all concurred in shewing, that they had a correspondence within, and that they reckoned so much on this, as to neglect the most common precautions of prudence. If they had only been provided with artillery for the siege, and that care had been taken

to let Admiral Macbride into the secret of this premature march, to be able to employ force if necessary, a place of the force of Dunkirk would probably have been carried before it could have received succours. Perhaps it would have been sufficient that this force was on the spot to have made its employment unnecessary; for, the grand means to draw advantage from intelligence within, is to be prepared to act without it.

As soon as it was perceived, that they could no longer reckon on their intelligence with the governor, unhappily regarded as infallible, they thought to have recourse to ordinary means of vigour, and to wait, in a sort of forced inaction, the arrival of the heavy artillery. During this time, some sloops with cannon and one or two armed vessels renewed incessantly their ravages in the camp of the allies, and destroyed with impunity the Austrian cavalry. The garrison, on its part, ap-

preciating daily more justly the menacing expressions of the summons, seeing that it was no longer intended even to invest them, receiving every instant, by the way of *Gravelines*, reinforcements of all kinds, and the assurance of being speedily relieved, made frequent sorties, and resisted more than ever every species of capitulation.

The same conventional hordes, that had abandoned positions the most impregnable at the meer approach of the allies, determined in their turn to make an offensive war when they saw them divided, and expected beforehand certain success from the union of almost all their forces against an army of forty thousand men, obliged to be again sub-divided into an army of observation and a besieging army, and to keep in check a garrison, the number of which might, at any time, be augmented, and their efforts directed. The camp of *Cassel* was intended as the place of rendezvous
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of the regicides; the troops arrived there by little and little in small detached parties, without an attempt being made to interrupt the march of a single battalion. In short, after having assembled their forces at leisure, since the place was not for an instant invested, after having well contrived the plan, and being assured of the means of execution, they rushed like a torrent into the plain: then the intrepid resistance of the allies only served to prolong the carnage, retard a few moments their defeat, and to expose to more imminent danger the person of the commander-in-chief, and one of the sons of the king of England, both wounded and on the point of being made prisoners. We know the excessive loss that took place in men, cannon, magazines, &c. and the rout of the Dutch at *Menin* and *Werwick*, which was the immediate consequence; nevertheless, general *Houchard*, who had just been crowned by so brilliant a victory, was almost immediately brought

to the scaffold; and, of all the generals that have fallen under the axe of the guillotine, he is, perhaps, the only one whose death cannot be regarded as an assassination, for it is certain that worse consequences might naturally have been expected.

The valour of the Austrian army and the skilfulness of their leaders soon checked the progress of the regicides, and drove them back within their own territory; but nothing could repair the enormous losses, of all kinds, of the allies, the animosities that were the consequence, the delay of the siege of *Maubeuge* at so advanced a season, and still less the dreadful effect of so many and great successes on opinion, in a war entirely of opinion. Hitherto the patriots had combated the allies, although fatal experience might in some sort have made them be considered as invincible: the victory at *Dunkirk* inspired them with the same presumption, awakened in their breasts
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the same hopes as amongst the savages of *America*, when they saw, for the first time, the Europeans fall under their blows, whom they had so long considered as beings of a superior class. They believed that nothing was wanting but to have their efforts well directed; nothing more was wanting to justify, in their eyes, the treasons which had been made the pretext for the disgrace or punishment of so many generals. One might expect them soon to exhibit new proofs of courage: an occasion soon presented itself.

The Austrians, who were on the point of surrounding *Maubeuge*, when the defeat of the allies obliged them to march with all speed on the side of *Menin*, perceiving how much the possession of this place ensured the tranquillity of a great extent of their frontiers, determined to attempt to carry it before the end of the campaign. All the redoubts that defended the approaches to it were attacked and

carried at once; already, in spite of the rigours of the season, the city was invested, and they pressed on the operations of the siege; when the regicides, who had collected, slowly and without opposition, all their forces on the side of *Landrecy* and *d'Avesnes*, made an attack on the army of observation. Not having succeeded in this, they determined to hazard another general battle the day following. It was then, that, stimulated by the madness of fanaticism and an abundance of strong liquors, they threw themselves in the mouth of the cannon, which mowed down whole ranks, without ceasing to sing their revolutionary airs in the midst of rivers of blood, the cries of the wounded, and heaps of mangled bodies. Nothing certainly could resist such fury, since the brave Austrians were obliged to abandon their posts. Their retreat was that of the lion overpowered by numbers, of which none dares approach too near, notwithstanding his loss of blood and the exhaustion of his forces.

forces. But, at last, the siege of *Maubeuge* was forced to be raised, and the operations confined to the defence of their own territory. With what confidence in their forces must not this astonishing success against the best troops and generals in Europe have inspired the Convention !

Whilst this was going on in this part of the frontiers, the famous lines of *Weissembourg*, which were long considered impregnable, were forced in less than an hour by the armies of General *Wurmser* and the Prince of *Condé*. The Prussians contributed, by their manœuvres, to the success of that day. One would naturally have expected more resistance, but the victory at *Weissembourg* was one consequence of the check at *Maubeuge* ; for, it appeared that the lines were greatly weakened to make the raising of the siege of that place more certain.

Let us not lose the occasion of making one consoling remark : — we observe that
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the continual transport of troops, so fatiguing and so destructive to men and horses, (from *Alsace* into *Flanders*, and from *Flanders* to *Alsace*, from the army of the north to that of *la Vendée*, from the defiles of *Savoy* under the walls of *Lyons*, from *Lyons* to *Toulon*, and from *Toulon* to *Perpignan*,) and the long inaction of the armies till the moment they receive reinforcements from other points, prove incontestibly that the Convention begins to suffer for its monstrous excesses, and that, obliged to send its partisans in every corner of the kingdom, to restrain their numerous enemies in the interior, they cannot employ against those without, so many men as they would have believed. It proves, likewise, that their powerful resistance depends chiefly on the manner in which they have been attacked, and on the liberty they have always had to unfurnish without inconvenience all points, to unite their immense force in that which was threatened.

To

To return to the lines of *Weissembourg* — after this grand success, the most important without doubt of the war, if the fruit had been gathered from it that might naturally have been expected, *Lauterbourg* and *Weissembourg* opened their gates; the victorious army made a march of several leagues without meeting a single enemy. The town of *Haguenau*, although covered by a considerable forest which might have retarded its capture, surrendered without resistance: the inhabitants appeared in the most favourable dispositions; the regicide army was in a manner dispersed and struck with consternation. *Straßbourg* itself, if we may credit a report which has universally spread itself, and which has not been contradicted, *Straßbourg* offered to open its gates to general *Wurmser*. But I wish not to support my reflections on probabilities or simple conjecture, and I cannot help thinking, that, when nothing less was thought of than striking a decisive

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five blow which might hasten the termination of the evils of humanity, that no clauses should have been suffered to exist, which I do not say could have provoked a refusal, but which could defer for an instant the conclusion of such a treaty.

It is at least incontestible, that the allies had a numerous and powerful party within the walls of *Strasbourg*, and that no advantage was taken of the first moments of consternation of the patriots, and of the rout of their army, to endeavour to get possession of that important place. It is likewise certain that they remained a long time inactive, which could not be owing to the rigours of the season, since the activity of the patriots was never for a moment relaxed. The only vigorous attempt that was made was the attack of *Fort-Louis*, which surrendered the first week. In short, after having thrown some shells into *Landau* for three or four days, this plan was entirely abandoned, to adopt the

the fatal and everlasting system of blockade; as if it were extraordinary to meet with a degree of resistance on the part of a place the strongest in the kingdom, and the most perfect work of M. *De Vauban*, of which the most paltry town was susceptible.

During this time, the Convention, whose great art consists in taking advantage of the errors of their enemies, and in employing the tedious intervals which have constantly separated their operations, hastened to send commissioners into *Alsace*. Terror, exactions, and seas of blood, marked their progress. After having put to death, as suspected persons, at the head of the army, all those that did not carry the revolutionary delirium to the last degree of exaltation, to confirm the pretended treachery which had explained to the eyes of the multitude the capture of the lines, they set about regenerating in their manner the city of *Strasbourg*; that

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is to say, all the places of administration were entrusted to the sans-culottes, approved by their energy and their perseverance in wickedness; the blood of the people of rank flowed in torrents under the axe of the guillotine, and the rich of all classes esteemed themselves too happy in preserving their lives at the expence of enormous pecuniary contributions. On all sides, the requisition for men was enforced with new activity; considerable reinforcements arrived from the army of *Jourdan*: secure of being able to draw off the troops without danger before an enemy that had gone into cantonments, they collected together all the garrisons of *Alsace* and *Lorraine*. I forbear to enter on a detail of the fate of the lines of LA MOTTER and its redoubts, as also of the blockade of LANDAU, which a little vigour and perseverance would long before have ensured the possession of, and which was essentially necessary to the tranquillity of the allied armies. The relation is too painful, the wound

wound still bleeds, it prolongs the reign of wickedness, and the consequences are irreparable to all the unfortunate inhabitants of the newly-acquired *Alsace*, the dutchy of *Deux-Ponts*, and that part of Germany which was obliged to be abandoned to the unexampled devastations of the regicides.

Let us not fear to be too much affected by truths, on which depends the safety of empires : let us compare the different circumstances of good and ill success, let us make a recapitulation more general and brief of the principal events of the last campaign. The prince of *Cobourg*, at the head of a small army, overcame the victorious forces of the patriots, pursued them always with bayonets fixed, delivered Holland, and made the conquest of the Low Countries in less than a month : the camp of *Famars*, which under Marshal *Villars* kept the enemy in check during a whole campaign, was carried in a few hours with
inconsiderable

inconsiderable loss: the famous camp of *César* was evacuated as soon as the allies formed the dispositions of attack; the intrenched camp of *Ghivelde*, and that under *Dunkirk*, made no long resistance; four thousand men, attacked in *Marchiennes*, were entirely cut to pieces or taken prisoners; lastly, a single hour was sufficient for the reduction of the formidable lines of *Weissebourg*.

Let us view the reverse of the picture:—the intrenchments of *Hondscote* were taken, inundated with the blood of the allies; the Dutch army that defended *Menin* and *Werwick* was put to the rout; the Austrians themselves, covered by numerous abatis, were compelled to raise the siege of *Maubeuge*; the approaches to *Toulon*, on which depended the fate of that city, and which there was time to fortify during four months, were forced in less than an hour; the lines of *la Motte* were obliged to be abandoned almost without resistance, where
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four-and-twenty redoubts furnished with artillery crossed their fire; the blockade of *Landau* was raised, and future ages will not believe the sad page of history of this iron age, when it informs them, that the armies of two of the most powerful potentates in Europe, commanded by General *Wurmser* and the Duke of *Brunswick*, have been driven from positions, which nature, art, and the season, contributed to render impregnable, by a confused mass of plunderers under the orders of *Hoche* and *Pichegru*; that they have been obliged to abandon not only all their conquests, but even their magazines, and an important part of their own territory, which they have seen ravaged in the most atrocious manner, after having placed the Rhine between them and the victorious banditti.

Is it not very natural to conclude, from this view, that the little success of the campaign ought to be much less attributed to the insufficiency of the force than to the

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means of employing it ? Does it not evidently result, that regard has neither been paid to the nature of this war, nor to the kind of enemy they had to combat ? In a war of opinion, and especially against the French, who join to their bravery and natural impetuosity all the delirium of fanaticism, the least check they feel is in general the forerunner of one more considerable ; the least delay is a fault of which the enemy take advantage to recover from their astonishment and to repair in an instant their forces : the system of a defensive war would bring on the inevitable destruction of the most numerous and most valiant armies. It is necessary always to attack the regicides, disperse them in time, march up to them before they have an opportunity to offer battle, be before-hand with them in every thing, harass them incessantly, pursue them to the utmost when they are worsted, attack them the day after victory shall have declared for them : with such

such a conduct as this, ordinary troops would be able to overcome them; by delay, forming *cordons*, *abbatis*, and *lines*, these banditti, by their destructive activity and their ferocious rage, would at length conquer the soldiers of Alexander; or, to choose at home our models of heroism, the Austrians themselves, who would waste in vain all their valour and skill.

The reasons, which a too-fatal experience has confirmed, are sufficiently obvious: I will make choice of one of great weight, which essentially relates to circumstances. No one is ignorant of the vivacity and warmth which distinguish the French: their habitual state would be a state of violence for others. Suppose now that all kinds of illusion are made use of to exalt this inflammable disposition, and you will have found an explanation of effects in appearance so extraordinary; but which astonish those only who have neglected to inquire

into their causes. You will see that the armies of the patriots are composed in great measure of deluded and ignorant people, united by want or by violence, but directed by experienced leaders. It will be seen, that they prepare them in some sort for combat, and then they resemble those savages, who, after having indulged in fermented liquors and sung their war-songs, become inspired with fury, brandishing their arms in a menacing manner; or to those dogs, naturally seized with fright at the sight of the lion, but easily excited to attack this terrible animal in front, who, after being surrounded by heaps of slain, is at last exhausted by assaults continually renewed. It will not be useless here to make known more particularly this infernal tactic so worthy of the monsters that invented it.

When the regicides mean to strike one of those grand blows, which the committee
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of public safety has traced the plan of, and for the success of which the head of the general is answerable; they assemble the army, the commissioners appear, decorated with all their distinctive marks, they read some bombast of the Convention or of the committee, and they add an harangue in the Oriental style of the day. Their sworn emissaries spread themselves amongst the ranks to make the necessary comments, applaud the brave, and excite the timid; the air is rent with shouts of *Vive la république!* with imprecations and blasphemies against all kings under the name of tyrants, against all subjects under the denomination of *slaves* or *vile satellites of despotism*. The women, or rather *furies* or *bacchantes*, distribute brandy in immense quantities; warlike music, which would excite the most cowardly, gives the last help to their fury, and fifty thousand wild beasts, foaming with rage, pour down with redoubled speed and with the cries of cannibals on

soldiers whose valour is excited by no passion. . . . Can one wonder that such a shock should stagger and finally overcome them ?

In attacking the patriots, on the contrary, one is always sure to take them in some sort unprovided; that is to say, that you have no longer to dread that fiery impetuosity, that mass, that combination of efforts which were only the effect of every kind of illusion; the paroxysm of that ardent fever, which augments so prodigiously the strength of the phrenetic, is over; every one is in his natural state, no common bond of union unites so many incoherent parts, they have no longer any substitute for great talents; distrust and want of discipline soon produce confusion and fear. It is then that the brave troops of the Prince of *Cobourg* and General *Clairfayt* regain all their superiority over the wild ferocious hordes under the orders of *Jourdan*,
Michau,

Michau, and that heap of petty subaltern villains, which fame has only preserved from obscurity to expose them to the execration of posterity. These factitious resources disappear with the cause that gave them birth; and, if they are surprized the instant afterwards, nothing is met with but a degree of feebleness proportioned to the state of violence to which they owed their success.

The same spirit of impartiality with which I am guided, and which makes me form such ardent wishes for the happy issue of the great events which balance the destiny of Europe, obliges me to add some other reflections on the conduct of the allies; for, the want of vigour, which has been attributed to the generals, extends itself also to the operations of governments, and has produced everywhere consequences equally fatal. It was said at the commencement of the last war, that the pen-

dulum of *M. de Sartine* always went slower than that of the English minister; with what reason might it not be said at present of the pendulums of all the cabinets of Europe, with regard to that of the *committee of public safety*? I shall only cite two examples in proof of a truth but too evident. The first is the unhappy war in *la Vendée*, carried on by subjects of the strictest fidelity; assembling themselves as it were by a miracle, maintaining themselves by an activity, a harmony, and perseverance, without example, providing themselves with arms, ammunition, and artillery from the regicides themselves by the firmness of their resolution. Is it possible, that such generous men, professing in all their purity the principles of religion and monarchy, should be left seven or eight months to depend on their own exertions, surrounded on all sides with enemies, without magazines, without strong places, having always the same army to oppose to armies

mies which are incessantly reinforced and renewed. At length, however, there appeared an intention to succour them, and measures were taken to that effect; but, whether it was owing to the fatality of circumstances, or the ill contrivance of the dispositions, when the royalists appeared on the coast, they found none of the succours they had hoped for. Unprovided with heavy artillery and with the means of attack, they marched to shed rivers of blood, under the walls of the paltry town of *Granville*, without the least utility; the fear of being betrayed, of being in want of necessaries, and of being shut up towards the ocean without any means of security, determined these generous victims to return into the interior, and to follow their rout in the midst of an innumerable multitude of enemies, their only resource in despair. The English armament arrived at *Guernsey* soon after; but this delay left nothing but tears to be shed for so many thousands

thousands of faithful subjects, the object of our dearest hopes and of the well-founded fears of the Convention. One cannot calculate the consequences of a conduct so contrary to the interests of sound policy and humanity. Already the monstrous edifice of the republic would have fallen to ruins if it had been early perceived, that France would never be conquered without more or less of the efforts of the French themselves; that the counter-revolution depended principally on the success of the royalists; that their army would naturally be increased by the number of faithful subjects that were oppressed or compelled to feign patriotism; lastly, that it was established in a canton extremely abundant, entirely unfurnished with strong places, where the success of one day might determine the conquest of many departments, and conduct the triumphant army under the walls of Paris,

I pass to the second example, which is not less afflicting nor less decisive for the progress of the allies. It will be sufficient to mention the facts. A piece of good fortune, and such as the chances of war have never perhaps furnished an example of, put *Toulon* into the hands of the English, without the loss of a man or the firing a single gun: they found there three-and-twenty ships of the line, of which two were of a hundred and twenty guns, three of eighty, and all the others of seventy-four, with a proportionate number of frigates and other vessels; three thousand cannon for the marine, without reckoning a considerable land-artillery, ammunition of all kinds in abundance, all sorts of stores for the equipment of a navy, and a population from twenty-five to thirty thousand inhabitants in general well disposed to sustain vigorously the decisive step they had taken, by at first disowning the authority of the Convention, and finishing by delivering themselves into the hands of its enemies.

enemies. Every thing concurred to engage the allies to put themselves as soon as possible in a state to carry on an offensive war,* and the geographical situation of *Toulon*, enabled them to do this with great advantage, particularly that, in carrying on their efforts, they would meet with no place in their way, whatever direction they took. The regicides were not in force in that part, had scarcely any troops of the line, and could, with extreme difficulty, procure ammunition and provisions. It was the only way to have made them evacuate the county of *Nice*, to restore by that means to the *Piedmontese* and *Austrian* army all its activity, to act in concert

* Little more force was necessary than to guard sufficiently the town and harbour of *Toulon*, where they were obliged to divide the troops into seventeen important posts, of which the principal, as the redoubt of *Balaguier*, and the mountain of *Pharon*, which were forced by the patriots, were nearly two leagues distant, and separated by the sea in such a way, as to be able to afford each other no kind of assistance.

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with the Spaniards of *Rouffillon*, and to take advantage of the vicinity of some provinces, whose disposition to bring about a counter-revolution was sufficiently apparent.

What was done to preserve so precious and un hoped-for a conquest? a garrison sufficiently weak, composed of four different nations, speaking as many languages, and still more divided in their views and animosities than by difference of language. Without doubt it was necessary at first to employ any that could be procured; but by what fatality was it that nothing was heard, except in the gazettes, of those six thousand Austrians who should have embarked forthwith at *Genoa* and *Leghorn*, and for which transports had been so long prepared? what could have deferred the sending an equal number of English, which had been assembled at *Cork* at the first moment almost, so long that they did not arrive

arrive till a month after the evacuation? Either of these reinforcements would probably have been sufficient to have defended this important place against the efforts of a body of five-and-twenty thousand men levied in haste. Its loss depended on the capture of a single redoubt, which there was time to have fortified at leisure, and which did not hold out an hour; while at *Cassel*, opposite *Mentz*, where there was not a vestige of fortification, the regicides in an instant threw up intrenchments so formidable, that the Austrians and Prussians seemed to think it impossible to attack them with success.

Penetrated with the conduct, superior to all praise, of the government and people of England, I reject with disdain the charges of disaffection to the cause which this event gave rise to; I regard them as the offspring of malevolence, or of that injustice which misfortune is too apt to inspire

inspire with. But, with the same spirit of impartiality and justice, I shall insist on one object which has not been sufficiently taken up, and which was the effect of the most atrocious policy, if it cannot be attributed to the most unexampled and inexcusable negligence; I ask why all the French ships were not sent for security to Italy or Spain, from the moment that fears began to be entertained for the preservation of the place, from the day when the British commissary, Sir Gilbert Elliot, imparted his fears to government, and concluded by saying, that, without a speedy reinforcement, he could scarce flatter himself to be in possession of Toulon by the 25th of December? The loyal French, reduced to regret in some sort that all the ships were not reduced to ashes, cannot but lament the loss of those which were a prey to the flames and which might have been preserved so easily.

Consider

Consider well, you, in whose hands reposes the destiny of Europe ; it is infinitely better not to have success, than to make retrograde motions. What confidence now can you hope to inspire the unhappy French with, even the greatest enemies to the present tyranny ? The respectable inhabitants of *Longwy*, of *Verdun*, and of a part of *Champagne*, who shewed you some regard, have paid with their heads, or at least they expiate in misery and exile, their efforts to favour the progress of your arms ; twenty thousand inhabitants of *Toulon*, of all ages, sex, and condition, wander in a strange land a prey to the horrors of indigence and despair, and many hundreds of those that remained in the walls of that unfortunate town, condemned to total destruction, have cursed, in the midst of their sufferings, your cruel visit ; the worthy inhabitants of *Haguenau*, and all the parts of conquered *Alsace*, are sacrificed

crificed or fled; those of *Fort Louis*, not knowing where to find a resting-place, regret not having, after the example of *Landau*, endeavoured to oppose you with all their might; the partial ravages of your bombs would only have more or less damaged their dwellings, which your mines have totally destroyed No: the loss of battles would not have hurt you so much as your ephemeral success.

But let us cast a veil over calamities unhappily irreparable; let us not recall past errors, but to gain salutary lessons for the future. That, which makes at present the object of our regret, ought, at the same time, to be the motive of our warmest hopes. It is evident, that the governments of Europe are far from having employed all the means in their disposal, and from having always made the best use of them, while we may defy the *committee of public safety* to shew a greater degree of union, of activity, vigour, or energy, than they have

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already exerted. Let kings lay aside (or at least adjourn to a time of greater tranquillity) those views of interest, those projects of aggrandizement, those personal animosities, those fatal calculations of egotism, which furnish to the malevolent such dangerous arms, which cool and discourage faithful subjects; let them be always just and magnanimous, let them shew themselves worthy their high stations; let clemency and goodness preside in their governments, and thereby gain all worthy hearts; but, at the same time, let a rod of iron be ready to strike the first disturber of the public peace, who should be tempted to mistake this goodness for weakness.

Let the generals put themselves above those miserable calculations, the offspring of pride, which have so often made the tears of humanity flow; let them well consider the sublimity of their august functions; let them not forget, that they
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do not belong to this or that nation in particular, but that all Europe has charged them to defend its glory, its interests, its existence even, against those hordes of cannibals, who have sworn its destruction and annihilation; let all their faculties be directed to this one end; let them call to mind, what would have become of Rome, if *Hannibal* had led on his victorious troops immediately after the battle at *Cannæ*; and that *Rome* soon accomplished the destruction of *Carthage*; in fine, let the example of Marshal *Boufflers*, placing himself, at *Malplaquet*, under the orders of *Villars*, who had a right to the command, and who pressed him to accept it, teach them, that true glory and the height of heroism consist in the sacrifice of personal considerations as often as any advantage can result to the public good. . . . Then, yielding on all sides, wickedness will expiate its bloody trophies; religion may hope to see her altars reared anew; so many victims, who groan in exile or op-

pression, will feel a sweet ray of hope in their bosoms, torn by all the evils which can afflict humanity ; the wealthy will be secure of transmitting to their children the patrimony of their fathers or the fruits of their own industry ; the virtuous citizen, in whatever class it may have pleased heaven to place him, will have again the satisfaction of seeing some serene days.

Now that I have relieved my oppressed heart, and fulfilled the task, imposed on every one, of contributing to the public good by the means which are in his power ; now that I have announced by my cries the danger which threatens the *capitol*, it would be perhaps proper to preserve silence ; but I think it my duty to make known the grand operation, which should be, according to my ideas, the basis of the plan of the campaign, and which I mention with hesitation, out of respect to the talents of the able generals who are

are at the head of the armies, and lest my zeal should carry me too far.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1794, it appears to me, that it should open with the siege of *Lisle*. At the instant that the tricoloured flag shall cease to fly on its ramparts, a great step will be gained towards a counter-revolution, and the people of France begin to think seriously of it; the regicides will be struck with consternation, the other towns will more readily open their gates. West Flanders will no more have to dread those continual incursions which lay it waste, the allies may advance with confidence into the interior, leaving behind them so important a place, and may carry with them a greater force, since they will have nothing to fear for a large extent of their frontiers. This measure appears to me indispensable, but I am far from concealing the difficulties that may attend it. I set out by supposing a collection of a very considerable

force ; for, by half-means no kind of plan can be crowned with success.

Five-and-forty thousand men, at least, ought to have charge of the operations of the siege ; an army of seventy thousand effective troops, the losses of which they should always be ready to repair, should be destined to cover the operations ; another body of nine or ten thousand men, almost entirely composed of light troops, should advance successively in front and on the wings to harass the enemy in different points, disperse them when they first attempt to assemble, and enable the grand army to avoid all unnecessary exertions. Let them not flatter themselves to proceed without difficulty in the siege of *Lisle*, as in that of *Valenciennes* ; on the contrary, they must expect to meet with the most multiplied and vigorous efforts. Still less let them think of waiting the effects in strong positions, or behind abbatis, as at *Maubeuge* ; the allies should dread all obstacles

stacles that might impede them an instant from pursuing the enemy. This army should be always in motion; it should march entire or in parties, to dissolve in time any collections of the enemy that were capable of resisting the light troops that might be formed in the neighbourhood. Should an innumerable multitude unite at a distance, with intention to pour down on them in a mass, let them exert themselves early to march and offer them battle in the most open country. That is the theatre worthy the invincible valour of the Austrians and their allies; it is there that the union of military virtues will be seen to triumph over those plundering hordes, marching under the standard of wickedness; it is there that a victory may be dearly bought, but it is there also that nothing can hinder their gathering the fruits of it, in pursuing to the utmost all the advantages, and by taking from the enemy, for a long time, the power of annoying them; for, if they once succeed in putting such

troops to the rout in the open plain, it would be impossible to rally them.

The conduct of the besieging army should in every thing correspond with that of the army of observation ; that is, their minutest operations should have for their object to conciliate the greatest possible activity with the indispensable rules of prudence ; and, in general, they should often depart from ancient methods in circumstances so new and unprecedented. Let immense quantities of ammunition be prepared before-hand, to be sure of not being obliged to suspend, or even relax, for an instant their efforts. Let there be transported under the walls of *Lisle* a great number of mortars, let them open the trenches the very day the troops present themselves before it, let nothing be neglected to strike with terror and astonishment by bold strokes and extraordinary activity, for this is of the first importance in a city, the numerous population of which must necessarily

rily have more or less influence on the
 garrison. Let the operations of the siege
 be carried on after this plan, modified by
 eventual circumstances; but let nothing
 relax the fire of the batteries; they will
 approach nearer according to the greater
 success of their works. Let no cold ball
 be thrown into the city, let the preference
 be given to shells, the terrible effect of
 which is so proper to attain the end propo-
 sed: let the number of times each piece is to
 be fired be fixed invariably beforehand, and
 at the precise minute let each of them deal
 out terror, devastation, and death.
 My heart bleeds in tracing these cruel
 lines: — is it I that can form such wishes?
 I, no whom the misfortunes of others
 make so deep an impression; I, who
 love my country so dearly, and who
 would give my blood to put an end to the
 calamities which afflict it? alas it is, and it
 is humanity that suggests to me these
 violent remedies, for the pure blood of
 France is spilt by a thousand channels; we
 must

must hasten, whatever be the price, to stop its course; and, to attain this end, nothing has remained for a long time past but to choose between bad and worse. The purity of my intentions comforts me, the importance of the object I aim at gives me courage. In so dreadful a crisis all parleying would be a crime; such fatal pity would resemble that of the surgeon, cruelly sensible, who, to save a few moments pain to his patient, should hesitate to cut to the quick to stop the progress of a gangrene; every timid consideration would have the same effect as the ignorant zeal of those, who, instead of pulling down in time the house adjoining to one on fire, should waste themselves in efforts to throw a trifling stream of water in the midst of the blaze, and thereby give a new activity to the devouring flames.

Nothing remains for me but to join with elevated hands the good of all countries, in supplicating the God of hosts
to

to bless this new crusade, undertaken in the most holy of causes, and truly worthy an enlightened age. Ill betide those unfeeling ones whose eyes are not opened by these days of tribulation, and who, in this astonishing series of supernatural events, do not mark and adore the hand that strikes us ! but their number diminishes every day, and religion sees, with tenderness, return into the fold, the flock that had strayed without probability of return. Deign, Omnipotence, to finish thy work, disarm thy just wrath, withdraw thy avenging arm, remove the fatal veil which conceals virtue from such a multitude of souls, purchased by thy blood, and which persist in running to their destruction ; deign to watch over the thousands of victims on the point of being sacrificed by the assassins hand ; preserve the unfortunate remains of that august family who offer us so terrible an example of the nothingness of worldly grandeur, restrain those hands that are lifted for their destruction,

tion, stop those currents of blood which are about to flow; in employing at thy command all the means in our power, it is in thee that we place our hopes! No longer suffer the triumph of wickedness, break the instruments of thy vengeance, and may the impious be taught at length to know the God they have so outraged!

All these fleeting examples, rigorous as they appear to us, will be so many signal favours, if, by thy grace, they teach to kings to shew themselves thy worthy images on earth; to people never to withdraw themselves from those bounds of submission which their true interest prescribes still more than their duty; to all of us, that this world is only an abode of grief and exile, and that we should hasten to profit by the misfortunes of this life to render ourselves worthy to taste at length more durable enjoyments!

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